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# TREND ANALYSIS 2024

MITROVICA 2024





# **TREND ANALYSIS 2024**

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# INTRODUCTION

## The annual public opinion survey “2024 Trend Analysis” conducted by the non-governmental organization AKTIV since 2016

Initially in four municipalities in the north of Kosovo, and since 2019 in all other Serb majority municipalities, is aimed to serve as a detailed study of changes in attitudes and perceptions of the Serb community in Kosovo on major socio-political issues.

Based on the survey, we conclude that negative trends still persist. One year after Banjska, the fear of open conflict is perhaps less prevalent, however in contrast, the feeling of insecurity is widespread. Serb citizens expect little good in the future.

The findings point unambiguously to a deeply rooted dissatisfaction and pessimism of the Serb community in Kosovo. Most respondents believe that the situation is not going in the right direction, with minimum expectations that their life will improve in the forthcoming years. Political instability and lack of trust in institutions, political parties and individuals further aggravate the feeling of insecurity, evident among a significant portion of respondents. When it comes to protecting Serb interests, international stakeholders, such as Russia, continue to enjoy the most trust, while ideas like demarcation remain unpopular. The increase in trust in local Serbian-language media is one of the few positive aspects of the findings.

As concluded in the introduction to last year’s research, “the great pressure the government in Pristina exerted against the Serb community, will have long-lasting negative consequences, on interethnic relations and overall cooperation between communities.” Instead of communication and cooperation, we have and will continue to have a growing sense of insecurity and mistrust.

The vast majority of respondents

**91.2%**

believe that the situation in Kosovo is not moving in the right direction. Only 1 in 10 respondents believe that life will be better for Serbs in Kosovo in the next three years, while

**57.9%**

of respondents believe that political instability is the major issue in Kosovo.

The most significant trends for 2024 are presented briefly in this chapter, while all of the available data are presented in detail in the text below. When it comes to key trends:

**72%**

of respondents say that **there are no** political parties or politicians in Kosovo they trust

According to the residents of the north, **the lowest trust prevails towards the Government and Serbian MPs in the Assembly of Kosovo**, and it scored “one”

On average **every fifth** Serb respondent considers that their safety **had been threatened** in the year behind us

**25.8%**

of respondents believe that A/CSM will be formed

Only **9%**

of respondents support the idea of demarcation, while

**18.3%**

are “open to the idea”.

**48.1%**

of respondents are against it.

**44.7%**

of respondents believe that among international stakeholders, **Russia is the best defender of Serb interests in Kosovo**

**A third of respondents** will “leave if a chance comes up”

We note **significant increase in trust** towards Serbian-language media from Kosovo.



## Research methodology and sample description

### RESEARCH METHOD:

The research was conducted in the field. Survey method served as the primary tool.

### INSTRUMENT:

The questionnaire consists of 43 questions.

### RESEARCH TIME:

The research timeframe extended between June and December 2024.


### SAMPLE SIZE:

A sample of 503 respondents formed the basis of analysis.

## SAMPLE STRUCTURE BY GENDER




## SAMPLE STRUCTURE ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENTS' PLACE OF RESIDENCE




# SAMPLE STRUCTURE BY AGE

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
Based on the distribution, we see younger respondents are more prevalent in the sample, compared to the older ones.



## SAMPLE STRUCTURE BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION



## SAMPLE STRUCTURE BY RESPONDENTS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS



The unemployed make up the major share of the surveyed sample, followed by a similar percentage of those employed in public institutions in the Serb system, and only 5.2% of self-employed respondents.

## Focus Groups and Deviations in Research Findings

During the implementation of the research, the need to organize additional focus groups emerged, with the aim of deepening the research process and clarifying discrepancies identified in the analysis of existing quantitative data. Notably, survey results from the municipality of Leposavić/Leposaviq showed significant deviations compared to other municipalities, particularly in the area of perceived security.

To gain a deeper understanding of these discrepancies, three focus groups were conducted, involving a total of 30 participants from diverse age groups, social strata, and professional backgrounds. These focus groups provided valuable insights into the local social and security context, which had not been fully captured by the quantitative instruments. The analysis of the qualitative data indicates that the 15% disparity in perceived security identified in the quantitative findings was not confirmed during the focus group discussions. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the timing of the research, which took place during the summer months—a period when security incidents are typically less frequent, potentially influencing citizens' subjective sense of safety. However, this assumption requires further verification, as official records show an increase in security incidents during that same summer, particularly in interactions between the police and the Serbian community.

In addition to the seasonal factor, another hypothesis emerging from the focus group discussion suggests that some respondents in the quantitative research may be related to, or personally connected with, employees of municipal institutions whose legitimacy has been contested due to the majority-Serb community's boycott of local elections. Such connections could have influenced the reported perception of security, particularly in relation to institutional trust and the public expression of opinions within a politically sensitive environment. Given the limited sample size, neither this hypothesis nor the seasonal explanation can be confirmed with a high degree of certainty. Nonetheless, these findings collectively highlight the importance of exercising caution when interpreting the results.

Discrepancies in the findings, as revealed through focus group analysis, may stem from a combination of the following factors:

- ▶ The seasonal timing of the research (conducted during the summer months), and
- ▶ The profile of certain respondents, who may be linked to local authorities and/or institutions whose legitimacy has been contested.

Key insights from all three focus groups—supported by audio recordings and discussion transcripts—indicate that the quantitative research results require further interpretation and should not be considered fully representative. These findings have been comprehensively analyzed and are presented in a dedicated annex to this document, along with recommendations for enhancing the methodology in future research cycles.



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# **SURVEY RESULTS**



## GENERAL ATTITUDES

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Regarding the political, economic, security and financial situation in Kosovo, respondents of Serbian nationality gave ratings on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest rating.

The first indicator - Situation assessment – points to how grave the situation actually is. On a scale of 1 to 5, respondents rated the security situation with extremely concerning 1.76 points; the political situation with an almost identical 1.79; economic situation with slightly higher 1.92; and finally, the material situation with 2.63.

	Average Score
Political situation	1.79
Economic situation	1.92
Security situation	1.76
Material situation	2.63

---

Even when people have basic living conditions, their quality of life remains deeply impaired. Scores of “one” for key indicators such as political stability, economic situation, and sense of safety go on to show that life is marked by uncertainty, fear, and deep dissatisfaction. Particularly devastating is the fact that only one in hundred respondents living in the north assessed their financial situation as good.


At the same time, average scores deteriorated compared to 2020. Back then, the listed indicators were rated with at least a “two” on average. The highest drop was observed last year after the events in Banjska. Hence, it is not surprising that the attitude “things are not going in a good direction” is shared by 90% of respondents, and there are no major differences among those who live north and south of the Ibar. The same decline since 2020, both in terms of the average score and in the number of those who believe that the situation is going in the good direction, is also noted here.

The following table shows the average scores for all four categories over the past 5 years.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Political situation	1.79	1.51	2.05	2.01	2.06
Economic situation	1.92	1.85	2.07	2.20	2.08
Security situation	1.76	1.46	2.04	1.93	2.17
Material situation	2.63	2.70	2.60	2.74	2.84

Significantly lower average scores were recorded in subgroups of respondents from the north of Kosovo.

■ North of Kosovo  
 ■ Serb-majority municipalities south of the Ibar




The following charts show the frequency of scores individually, for each area, in relation to the respondents' place of residence.




## POLITICAL SITUATION

As many as 90% of respondents living in the north of Kosovo assessed the political situation as very bad or bad. Citizens in the south assess the political situation as somewhat better, however again there are 69% of respondents who perceive it as bad or very bad. The share of respondents who find the political situation bad has remained extremely high, while the number of those who consider it good has decreased further.




## ECONOMIC SITUATION

The trend of declining satisfaction with the economic situation has also continued, with the (only) difference being that in the north, more people rate it as very bad, and in the south, there are more people who use the term “bad” to describe it. However, there are significantly more citizens in the south who rate the economic situation as “neutral” (25.4%) and even “good” (10.2%).”




## SECURITY SITUATION

Public opinion polls indicate that the security situation in Kosovo still remains very poor. As many as 66.8% of respondents in the north of Kosovo find the security “very bad”, while only 2.8% rate it as “good”. The situation is no different in the south of Kosovo, where only 4.7% of citizens find security “good”. These data clearly show there is a high share of population who still perceive the security situation as a serious issue.




## MATERIAL SITUATION




Like the economic situation, respondents living south of the Ibar also find their material situation somewhat better.

## ARE THINGS IN KOSOVO GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?

The vast majority of respondents – 91.2% – responded to this question with “not at all” or “mostly not”.



If we break down the responses further, according to the respondents' place of residence, we get the following ratio, when it comes to areas north and south of the Ibar:



The prevailing assessment is, hence, extremely negative, with a small difference observed in the south, with still 10.5% of those who believe that things are “mostly” going in the right direction.

This score has been continuously deteriorating since 2020. The share of “pessimists” culminated in 2023, only to see the situation improve slightly this year.



Only every 12<sup>th</sup> respondent shares an optimistic attitude about the future of Kosovo.




**IN YOUR OPINION, LIFE FOR SERBS  
IN KOSOVO IN THREE YEARS'  
TIME WILL BE:**

Only one in 10 respondents, on average, believes that lives of Serbs in Kosovo will be “better” in the coming three years. At the same time, Serb citizens living south of the Ibar are even less optimistic; only 8% of them believe in a better future, compared to 12% in the north.

Here, it is interesting to note that in the north we have both more citizens who believe that things will be “worse” and those who hope they will be “better”, which we see as an indication of community fatigue and disorientation.



The number of those who expect the situation to get even worse in the years to come is growing every year.




## Who or what contributed the most to such a situation?


A good description was offered by one of our interviewees: “The actions of Pristina authorities in the past 3 years have contributed for citizens to see the security situation as very grim. Repressive police methods and populist measures by Pristina authorities at the detriment of the Serb community have impacted the poor security, especially in the north, which is why a number of citizens left Kosovo for good. If we look at the previous four years, it is clear that the trend of deteriorating security is a direct result of the political situation, which continues to create huge dividing lines between communities, especially between Albanian and Serbian ones, while today, unlike before, many young people view Kosovo government and police as open enemies.”

## IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN KOSOVO?

Citizens are well aware of the reasons behind the noted situation and not one of them is singled out. According to the respondents' perception, the most concerning reasons include: political instability (57.9%) and economic situation/unemployment (57.1%), and are their major challenges. Issues such as youth migration (54.9%) and security (51.1%), are also prevalent, pointing to social and personal insecurity. A relatively smaller, but still largely significant portion of respondents list the attitude of Kosovo authorities towards non-majority communities (46.1%), and then crime and corruption (42.9%) as key issues. There are no significant differences in responses of respondents south and north of the Ibar.



The difference in attitudes between citizens living north and south of the Ibar is not large.





We have seen a particular deterioration in the past four years when it comes to the economic situation. The number of those who see it as a reason to (potentially) leave has now doubled.

	2024	2023	2022	2021
Political instability	57.9%	69.2%	39.2%	52.6%
Economic situation/Unemployment	57.1%	58.4%	65.4%	25.2%
Security	51.1%	64.6%	38.8%	47.4%
Crime and corruption	42.9%	46.6%	40.6%	43.7%
Migration, youth departure	54.9%	52.2%	53.5%	51.1%



## HAS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN KOSOVO CHANGED IN THE LAST YEAR?

Logically, it already got worse in the year behind us. Even if they don't find it worse, citizens find it has not changed for the better, or rather, they find it remained the same. Considering the import restrictions, ban of the dinar, as well as a range of other measures that have made the living conditions of the Serb community more challenging, it does not surprise that this opinion is shared by the majority (56.5%) of respondents.




The findings are similar to the previous year, 2023.

	Yes, it has improved	Yes, it deteriorated	Nothing has changed	No response
2024	5.2%	56.4%	38.4%	0%
2023	2.2%	63.8%	33.4%	0.6%


## HOW DID THE DECISION OF CENTRAL BANK OF KOSOVO TO BAN THE DINAR AFFECT YOU?

The overall deterioration of the situation for the Serbian community in Kosovo — not only in economic terms but also socially — has been significantly influenced by the decision of the Central Bank of Kosovo to abolish the dinar as a means of payment, both in the north and south of Kosovo. Although formally administrative, this measure has had far-reaching and concrete consequences for the daily lives of the population, particularly among vulnerable groups such as pensioners, recipients of social assistance, and people with limited mobility. In addition to the closure of NLB Komercijalna Banka, one of the few financial institutions licensed to operate with dinars, branches of the Serbian Post and Postal Savings Bank across Kosovo have also been shut down. These changes have further complicated access to basic financial services for all segments of the population, forcing many citizens to travel hundreds — and in some cases, even more than several hundred — kilometers to access their salaries, pensions, child benefits, and other social transfers. Public opinion surveys revealed that even among the 10% of respondents who reported having no income in dinars, the consequences of this decision were felt through the further destabilization of the local economy. One respondent remarked, “Official Pristina has gained the most, as it has effectively abolished the Serbian currency as a means of payment,” adding, “Official Belgrade also contributed to this by failing to find mechanisms to prevent the closure of NLB Komercijalna Banka in Kosovo.”

In addition to the financial aspect, another significant setback has been the ban or severe restrictions on the import of goods from the Republic of Serbia, which further jeopardizes the economic survival of Serbian businesses in Kosovo — both in the north and south. Business entities in the trade and service sectors are particularly affected, facing reduced revenues, difficulties in procuring goods, and rising operational costs. This situation poses a long-term threat to the sustainability of their businesses and the livelihoods of their employees.



The differences in responses between citizens living north and south of the Ibar are insignificant.








**TRUST IN  
DECISION  
MAKERS**


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## HOW OFTEN DO YOU FOLLOW POLITICAL EVENTS?



The analysis of the collected data reveals that members of the Serbian community in Kosovo closely follow the political situation. According to the survey results, 21.7% of respondents reported following political developments daily, while an additional 37% do so frequently. Combined, these figures indicate that 58.7% of respondents consistently monitor political events, reflecting a relatively high level of awareness and interest in political affairs. When examining this year's trends, the difference between Serb-majority municipalities north and south of the Ibar River is relatively small. However, a slightly higher percentage of citizens who rarely follow political developments come from municipalities located south of Ibar. This discrepancy can be partly attributed to varying degrees of exposure to security, administrative, and institutional pressures, as well as differences in access to media content in the Serbian language.




Trends indicate that the number of citizens following the political situation frequently or on a daily basis has been steadily increasing year by year. This development is unsurprising, given the ongoing political and institutional instability that profoundly affects the daily lives of the Serbian community in Kosovo. The growing interest in political processes may also stem from a heightened sense of insecurity and the need for citizens to stay informed about potential changes that directly impact their livelihoods—such as the abolition of the dinar, the closure of institutions financed by the Republic of Serbia, the overall security situation, and numerous local and international political initiatives concerning the status and rights of Serbs in Kosovo.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
I don't follow at all	11.3%	7.8%	10.1%	15%	10%
Rarely	30%	32.6%	40.9%	44.1%	42.6%
Often	37%	34.6%	36.4%	30.9%	31.7%
Daily	21.7%	25%	12.6%	10%	15.7%



## ARE THERE ANY MALE/FEMALE POLITICIANS IN KOSOVO THAT YOU TRUST?


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The research findings reveal a pronounced and widening gap between political actors and members of the Serbian community in Kosovo. Based on the data collected, it is evident that there is currently no political party or individual within political landscape that commands broad and stable trust among this community. The lack of a clearly defined leader in whom citizens place their trust underscores a serious problem of political representation and reflects a widespread perception among citizens that their needs and interests are being systematically neglected. This phenomenon is not temporary but rather represents the continuation of a long-standing trend of distrust in political leaders, a trend that has only deepened over the years. Surveys conducted over the past five years consistently show growing skepticism, with previously held expectations toward institutions and political representatives—both local and from Belgrade—largely perceived as unmet. As a result, a significant portion of the population has developed a sense of political frustration and disillusionment, further complicating processes of democratization, civic participation, and the empowerment of local communities.

In this context, the year 2023 marks the culmination of this growing mistrust, recording the lowest level of confidence in political actors since the start of indicator monitoring. Notably, this mistrust is particularly pronounced in the municipalities of northern Kosovo, where political dynamics are more closely tied to security challenges, institutional changes, and various pressures, as well as events that have left a strong mark on the collective memory of the local population (e.g., withdrawal from institutions, incidents involving KFOR and Kosovo police forces, and the shutdown of Serbian-funded institutions).

This decline in trust toward political leadership can also be interpreted as a call to redefine the relationship between political structures and citizens, highlighting the need for greater transparency, accountability, and a genuine representation of the Serbian community's interests in Kosovo. According to many citizens, these interests have remained unrecognized and unprotected in recent years.



	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Yes	8.9%	6%	8.4%	10.9%	14.3%
No	72%	83.5%	67.1%	60.2%	58.7%
I don't follow politics well enough to answer	19.1%	9.9%	24.5%	28.9%	27%
No response	0%	0.6%	0%	0%	0%

## WHICH SERBIAN POLITICIAN/ POLITICAL PARTY IN KOSOVO DO YOU TRUST?

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Going through the findings, we could conclude that there is no single specific politician whom the Serb community trusts. However, it's not that citizens trust "no" politicians, they simply do not respond to the question on whom they trust and the results go on to show precisely that. Only 2.8% of respondents trust the Serbian List; 1.4% trust the Serbian Democracy. When it comes to exact names and surnames, 1.2 % trust Saša Milošević, and 0.8% Aleksandar Arsenijević. Trust in other political options and politicians is negligible (less than 0.5%).

No response	86.9%
No one	4.0 %
Serbian List	2.8%
Serbian Democracy	1.4%
Saša Milošević	1.2%
Aleksandar Arsenijević	0.8%
Freedom, justice and survival	0.4%
Kosovo Serb Party	0.4%
NPS	0.4%
Aleksandar Vučić	0.4%
Stefan Veljković	0.3%
SNS	0.2%
Rašić	0.2%
"I follow political developments, but I trust no one"	0.2%
Branislav Nikolić	0.2%
Branimir Stojanović	0.2%

## WHICH ALBANIAN POLITICIAN/ POLITICAL PARTY IN KOSOVO DO YOU TRUST?

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The picture is gloomier when it comes to trust in politicians from the majority, Albanian community. 94% of respondents did not respond to the question; only 0.4% trust the current Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, and 5.4% of respondents explicitly answered they trust “no one”. Compared to 2023, when some respondents added Veton Surroi to the list, this year, apart from Prime Minister Kurti, not a single name was listed.

<b>No response</b>	<b>94.2%</b>
<b>A. Kurti</b>	<b>0.4%</b>
<b>No one</b>	<b>5.4%</b>



**TRUST IN  
INSTITUTIONS**



**ON A SCALE OF 1 TO 5, RATE HOW SATISFIED YOU ARE WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONS:**

	<b>Average Score</b>
<b>Interim local self-government bodies</b>	<b>2.33</b>
<b>Municipalities in the Kosovo system in Serb-majority areas</b>	<b>2.13</b>
<b>Office for Kosovo and Metohija</b>	<b>2.37</b>
<b>Government of Serbia</b>	<b>2.49</b>
<b>Government of Kosovo</b>	<b>1.68</b>
<b>Serbian MPs in the Assembly of Kosovo</b>	<b>1.72</b>
<b>Serbian ministers in the Government of Kosovo</b>	<b>1.71</b>
<b>Kosovo Police</b>	<b>2.22</b>
<b>UNMIK</b>	<b>2.35</b>
<b>EU Office in Kosovo</b>	<b>2.20</b>
<b>EULEX</b>	<b>2.21</b>
<b>KFOR</b>	<b>2.55</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>2.31</b>

When it comes to trusting institutions, the trends observed in previous years persist. Serbs trust more (mostly) the following, in this order: KFOR (average score 2.55), Government of Serbia (2.49), Office for Kosovo and Metohija (2.37) and UNMIK (2.35), as well as the interim bodies of local self-government (2.33) and OSCE (2.31), respectively. The other end of the scale includes the Government of Kosovo (1.68), Serbian ministers in the Government of Kosovo (1.71), Serbian MPs in the Assembly of Kosovo (1.72) and municipalities in the Kosovo system in Serb-majority areas (2.13). EU Office in Kosovo (2.20), EULEX (2.21) and Kosovo Police (2.22) are somewhere in the middle. Hardly anyone could be satisfied with these scores. Trust is somewhat higher – although far from great – in Serb-majority areas south of the Ibar. There, the average rating is a grade higher for all stakeholders, with the exception of the Government of Kosovo (1.44 north, 1.94 south of the Ibar); Kosovo Police (1.93 north, 2.5 south of the Ibar) and, interestingly, KFOR (which, again, got the best rating overall).


	North of Kosovo	Municipalities with Serb majority south of the Ibar
Interim local self-government bodies	1.81	2.82
Municipalities in the Kosovo system in Serb-majority areas	1.57	2.66
Office for Kosovo and Metohija	1.85	2.88
Government of Serbia	1.92	3.04
Government of Kosovo	1.40	1.94
Serbian MPs in the Assembly of Kosovo	1.30	2.12
Serbian ministers in the Government of Kosovo	1.37	2.04
Kosovo Police	1.93	2.50
UNMIK	2.03	2.66
EU Office in Kosovo	1.85	2.54
EULEX	1.98	2.44
KFOR	2.37	2.72
OSCE	1.87	2.73

Perhaps as expected, apart from the Government of Serbia, the Office for Kosovo and Metohija, and the interim local self-government bodies, there is no institution with whose work citizens have been satisfied in the past 5 years to justify the score “good” (2.5 - above). KFOR is somewhat around here, with an increased trust compared to 2020 (from 2.23 to 2.55). Once more, it seems that among citizens of Serb nationality a desire prevails to trust the institutions of the international community (UNMIK, EU, EULEX) in relation to the difficult year of 2023.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Interim local self-government bodies	2.33	2.17	2.55	2.59	2.56
Municipalities in the Kosovo system in Serb-majority areas	2.13	2.15	2.50	2.60	2.45
Office for Kosovo and Metohija	2.37	2.46	2.74	2.82	2.54
Government of Serbia	2.49	2.53	3.07	3.22	2.89
Government of Kosovo	1.68	1.61	1.77	1.73	1.95
Serbian MPs in the Assembly of Kosovo	1.72	1.80	2.14	2.21	2.12
Serbian ministers in the Government of Kosovo	1.71	1.74	2.08	2.25	2.12
Kosovo Police	2.22	1.79	/	/	/
UNMIK	2.35	2.09	2.08	1.95	2.19
EU Office in Kosovo	2.20	1.95	1.99	1.95	2.09
EULEX	2.21	1.99	1.96	1.79	1.96
KFOR	2.55	2.18	2.31	2.09	2.23




## IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH OF THE KEY INTERNATIONAL FACTORS, IS THE BEST DEFENDER OF THE INTERESTS OF SERBS IN KOSOVO?




Citizens of Serbian nationality in Kosovo continue to place the most trust in Russia (44.7%), although this percentage has significantly and steadily declined over the years, dropping from a high of 69.6% in 2020. This decline indicates a shift away from the predominantly emotional and traditional reliance on Russia, toward a more rational evaluation of its actual capacity to influence the situation in Kosovo. At the same time, trust in the European Union has been gradually but encouragingly increasing—currently standing at 21.9%, with an even higher figure of 28.5% south of the Ibar River. This trend can be attributed to the EU’s increased visibility through concrete projects and support for local communities.

However, northern Kosovo still shows deep distrust, with only 15% of respondents there viewing the EU as a protector of Serbian interests. Trust in China remains stable at a lower level (14.1%), with no significant fluctuations. Changes in the perception of international actors suggest a shift toward a more rational approach, where citizens increasingly value concrete results over historical or political symbolism. The decline in trust in Russia indicates that emotional loyalty is no longer sufficient without tangible support. The EU has the potential to further strengthen trust, especially if it responds to the specific needs of communities north of Ibar. These findings provide an opportunity for international partners to reconsider their approach, with the goal of reinforcing stability and building trust on the ground.



	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
European Union	21.9%	15.7%	9.8%	8.9%	7.7%
Russia	44.7%	56.9%	64.3%	65.6%	69.6%
USA	2.4%	2.8%	1.7%	3%	1.7%
China	14.1%	11.8%	13%	17%	13.3%

## DO YOU HAVE ANY PERSONAL DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY KOSOVO INSTITUTIONS (IDENTITY CARD, PASSPORT, DRIVER'S LICENSE, BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND CITIZENSHIP (EXTRACT))...?





The data reveals a clear upward trend in the number of citizens holding Kosovo-issued documents. Compared to the previous year, the proportion of those without such documents has decreased from 13% to 6.4%. Citizens have often opted to accept the issuance of new documents due to the non-recognition of those issued by the Republic of Serbia and the inefficiencies within the administration. Many have encountered issues such as waiting over two months to obtain documents, denial of language rights, and misconduct at civil registry offices. Difficulties in obtaining birth certificates have been particularly reported, especially for individuals not born in Kosovo or for parents applying for personal documents for their children.

Unpleasant experiences, such as unkind officials and administrative obstacles, have further complicated the process. Although the path to accepting Kosovo-issued documents has not been easy, the growing number of citizens choosing to take this step can be seen as a positive signal. This trend is also observed in northern Kosovo, where 10% of respondents still do not possess Kosovo-issued documents. Despite some resistance, more citizens are opting to obtain ID cards due to everyday needs and access to basic rights. These results point to a gradual yet meaningful shift that may contribute to strengthening dialogue and fostering future stability.



## DID YOU FACE ANY ISSUES WHILE OBTAINING ANY DOCUMENTS?







**STANCES  
TOWARDS  
ACTIVE  
PARTICIPATION  
IN POLITICAL  
PROCESSES**



## WHAT IS YOUR STANCE TOWARDS THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS/TALKS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE EU (BRUSSELS DIALOGUE)?




In 2024, there has been a significant increase in public support for the Brussels negotiation process between Belgrade and Pristina. Unlike in 2023, a growing number of citizens now view dialogue as the most realistic option for resolving disputes. This shift in perception is largely due to political and security developments that have heightened the sense of urgency and the need for compromise. According to the data, 41.7% of respondents have no clear position on the continuation of negotiations, while support and opposition are now equal at 29% each. Support for dialogue is particularly stronger in northern Kosovo, where the consequences of political decisions are most visible. Compared to 2020, the number of supporters has increased by 9%, while the number of opponents has decreased. Events from both the previous year and earlier have reinforced the belief in the importance of negotiations. Compared to 2023, support for the process has grown, while opposition has significantly decreased. Although the proportion of those without a clear stance remains high, it has remained stable.




	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
I support it	29%	18.2%	17.5%	22.4%	20.6%
I don't support it	29%	42.8%	40.5%	25.9%	28.7%
I have no position	41.7%	39%	42%	51.7%	50.7%
No response	0.3%	0%	0%	0%	0%

## IN YOUR OPINION, HOW WILL THE CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA AFFECT THE SERBIAN COMMUNITY IN KOSOVO?



Decision-makers and mediators involved in the dialogue process must seriously consider the fact that citizens, both north and south of the Ibar River, predominantly do not expect the dialogue to improve the quality of life for the Serbian community. Although there are some differences in perception between the north and the south, they are minimal, indicating a general atmosphere of mistrust. Compared to 2023, it is encouraging that fewer citizens expect the situation to worsen, while there has been a slight increase in the number of optimists. These trends suggest that there is room for rebuilding trust, but for that to happen, the dialogue process must be more visibly linked to tangible improvements in citizens' everyday lives. Without stronger communication about the benefits that dialogue can bring to local communities, skepticism will remain a major challenge to the sustainability of the agreements reached.





	2024	2023	2022	2021
It will improve the quality of life of the Serb community	19.9%	14.1%	15%	18.9%
The quality of life of the Serb community will deteriorate	31.4%	35.9%	38.1%	23.7%
Everything will remain the same	48.5%	50%	46.9%	57.4%
No response	0.2%	0%	0%	0%



## WILL THE ASSOCIATION/COMMUNITY OF SERB MUNICIPALITIES BE FORMED?

A slightly higher number of respondents believe that the Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities (A/CSM) will be formed, with 25.8% of those who answered “Yes, it will”, and 27.5% answering “It will, but not this year”. 46.7% of respondents answered that “It will not be formed”.




	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Yes, it will	25.8%	19%	14%	14.1%	10.5%
It will, but not this year	27.5%	33.5%	27.3%	38.5%	31.5%
It will not be formed	46.7%	47.5%	58.7%	47.4%	58%

Compared to previous years, there is a slight increase in belief that the ASM will eventually be established. For instance, in 2020, only 10% of respondents believed in its eventual establishment, while as many as 58% thought it would not happen. This shift, though limited, may suggest growing, if cautious, trust in the potential implementation of political agreements.


The motivations behind support for the ASM are further illustrated by one respondent’s comment: “Belgrade-based media present it as something significant that Serbs in Kosovo are supposed to gain.” This perception underscores the influential role of media narratives in shaping public opinion and expectations regarding the ASM. Overall, the findings show that while the anticipation for the ASM’s eventual establishment is increasing, skepticism remain strong —particularly concerning the speed of implementation and the political will required to implement the agreement in the near future.

## DO YOU SUPPORT THE IDEA OF DEMARCATIION, OR DIVISION OF KOSOVO?

Citizens are less keen on wanting to see the “demarcation” scenario. 48,1% of respondents are against it, and only 9% “fully support it”. 18.3% are “open to the idea”.



As expected, north of the Ibar, we have more people who “support it”. Yet, here too, a majority of 57.9% is completely against or do not support demarcation.




The number of those who are absolutely against it has however decreased compared to 2020, from 58.7% to 48%. At the same time, citizens were far more open to this idea in 2023.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
I fully support it	8.9%	14.8%	4.2%	4.3%	4.8%
I do not have sufficient information, but I'm open to the idea	18.3%	16.7%	12.1%	20.6%	12.2%
I do not have sufficient information, but I do not support the demarcation	24.7%	17.8%	32.7%	21.1%	24.3%
I do not support it at all	48.1%	50.7%	51%	54.1%	58.7%

## HOW WOULD THE POSSIBLE DEMARCATION AFFECT YOUR DECISION TO REMAIN IN KOSOVO?

One thing is certain: the demarcation would lead to rapid departure of Serb citizens living south of the Ibar. Out of these municipalities, 52% of respondents responded they would leave their current place of residence. Things are somewhat different in the north, although even in those four municipalities there are many who answer “it will have no effect” (49.8%).




Here, we also observe a certain rise, not to say normalization, of the idea of demarcation, but for most citizens it is far from the desired scenario. In 2020, there were half as many of those who believed that demarcation would “help them stay.”

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Negatively, I would leave my current place of residence	37.8%	42.8%	29.4%	33.1%	41.3%
It will have no effect	46.3%	46.5%	62.2%	57.2%	51.9%
Positively, demarcation would help me stay in my place of residence	14.9%	10.7%	8.4%	9.6%	7.6%
No response	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%


In the past 5 years, the percentage of those who believe they would leave ranged around 40%. Considering the ongoing migration processes, it is reasonable to assume that with the demarcation, the Serb community living south of the Ibar would cease to be a political factor.

**APART FROM KOSOVO REMAINING IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF SERBIA, WHICH OF THE OFFERED SCENARIOS OF A POSSIBLE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA WOULD BE THE MOST ACCEPTABLE FOR KOSOVO SERBS?**

Finally, what would the citizens themselves want? Shortly put, either the Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities (CSM) that was promised to them back in 2013, or – nothing (“none of the proposed answers”). Demarcation, division, exchange (north of Kosovo for the Presevo Valley)... is far from the desired scenario, as is the explicit recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.



Support to A/CSM formation is greater south of the Ibar.



A/CSM “popularity” as an option has gradually grown over the past 5 years, from 29% to the present 40%. Not the least, the number of those in favor of maintaining the current situation (“status quo”) has steadily declined, from 27.6 to 11.3%. Further: “The attitude towards this issue has changed year to year in accordance with the position of Serbs. After the ban of the dinar, interim bodies and the work of the Post of Serbia, people only see A/CSM, as an institutional mechanism of protection.”

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
<b>Formation of the Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities (in accordance with previously reached agreements)</b>	40%	40.5%	20.4%	31.3%	29%
<b>Exchange of territory (north of Kosovo for Presevo Valley)</b>	6.6%	4.3%	4.6%	2.4%	2.4%
<b>Recognition of Kosovo independence by official Belgrade</b>	6.2%	0.9%	1.3%	0.6%	2.6%
<b>Maintaining the current situation (status quo)</b>	11.3%	13.4%	25.9%	21.3%	27.6%
<b>None of the proposed answers</b>	33.8%	29.3%	47.8%	44.4%	38.5%
<b>Something else</b>	2.1%	11.6%	0%	0%	0%

Those who responded they would like “something else” offer different answers. The ones that were the most interesting to us were “the most acceptable thing for Serbs is for Kosovo to remain part of Serbia, which is impossible”; then “Pristina and Belgrade should invest in economic development in the next ten years and then some new generations should talk about the future”; followed by “declaring the occupation of part of the territory” (obviously influenced by the media) and finally “international community should take over Kosovo as a protectorate”.





**FREEDOM OF  
EXPRESSION  
AND ACCESS TO  
INFORMATION**

**ANALYSIS**

335

175

350

295

320

290

DDD  
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
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


## HOW DO YOU FORM YOUR VIEWS ON POLITICS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS?

Although the media continue to play a notable role in shaping citizens' views about the situation in Kosovo—22.5% of respondents directly affirmed this influence — an increasing number of citizens express the belief that they form their opinions independently. On average, the share of those who claim to shape their own views has risen by 10% compared to 2020, indicating a growing sense of individual autonomy in interpreting political and social developments.



A particularly interesting trend has been observed in northern Kosovo, where as many as 40% of respondents state that they do not rely on traditional sources of information, instead forming their opinions independently. This may reflect longstanding dissatisfaction and mistrust toward both institutional sources and media narratives, especially in light of political crises and security incidents. Supporting this observation is the fact that only 20% of respondents in the north acknowledge a significant influence of traditional media on their views, compared to 24.6% in the south.




While traditional media have seen a decline in influence, social networks continue to play a visible role in shaping public opinion. At the same time, family and close social circles remain stable factors in opinion formation. Interestingly, the views of religious leaders appear to have virtually no impact on citizens' attitudes, further confirming the secularization of political decision-making and the rationalization of viewpoints, at least declaratively. This growing individualization in opinion formation may carry significant implications for future public communication processes. Citizens are becoming more critical of the information they receive, and effective public opinion shaping now requires more than simple media narratives. It demands convincing arguments, personal experiences, and visible results of political decisions.


	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
<b>Information from the media</b>	22.5%	26.6%	19.3%	20.6%	22.7%
<b>Information from social media (e.g. Facebook, Telegram group, etc.)</b>	11.7%	-	-	-	-
<b>Opinion and stances of your family, friends and colleagues</b>	8.5%	4.6%	8.7%	12.4%	16.4%
<b>Opinions and stances of politicians</b>	2.2%	4.9%	2.8%	2%	3.5%
<b>Opinions and stances of religious leaders and institutions</b>	1.6%	2.5%	1.7%	2%	0.7%
<b>All of the above</b>	19.5%	29.6%	29.7%	29.1%	32.2%
<b>I create my own opinion</b>	34%	31.9%	37.8%	33.9%	24.5%

## DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN THIS YEAR'S CENSUS IN KOSOVO?

The attitude towards this year's census serves also as an indicator of distrust. The majority either did not participate (44.9%) or did not want to respond (11.9%), while 43.2% participated.



As expected, the majority of those who participated live south of the Ibar, although there were also those (23%) who did not take part.




Again, according to one of our interviewees, “the lower turnout in the north was primarily due to the revolt of citizens caused by the overall political and security situation, primarily relating to the north of Kosovo, and then due to the unclear position of official Belgrade and calls to boycott the census by certain Serbian political representatives.” However, the interviewee continues, “the main reason why Belgrade did not call upon Serbs to participate in the census is precisely so that the exact number of Serbs would not be known, as it has been decreasing year by year, and somehow it would imply a defeat of both Belgrade and Serbian List policy in the past 10 years in Kosovo.”

At the same time, another interlocutor says that “the illegitimate authorities in the north have no capacities to conduct a census.” “The call for a boycott probably had an impact on the enumerators as well, as it was quite unpopular to become an enumerator under community pressure.” “Even if there were no calls for boycott,” our interlocutor believes, “there would be many issues with the quality of the data collected.” Lastly, “the level to which they delved into citizens’ personal data, particularly women’s medical histories, was perhaps excessive and unnecessary in some contexts.”


However, the low census turnout will have consequences – “the new budget is already under preparation, and it is estimated that incomplete data from the Statistics Agency for the north will be utilized, leading to lower budget of municipalities in the north. In the south, “Gračanica and Štrpce, which had a higher turnout, may expect a budget increase”.

## WHAT TYPE OF MEDIA DO YOU MOST OFTEN GET INFORMATION FROM?

Citizens of Serb nationality living in Kosovo mostly get their information through web portals, as well as mainstream media (TV, radio programs). Social media rank the third.



Citizens living in the north are somewhat keener to trust information received via social media.



In the past 5 years, the importance of mainstream media has been relatively declining, while the number of those who get their information via web portals saw a significant rise.


	2024	2023	2022	2021
Mainstream media (TV, radio)	32%	39%	34.6%	38.5%
Print media (newspapers)	2.6%	4.8%	3.8%	7.6%
Web portals of media companies	43.3%	31.2%	31.1%	30.6%
Social media (Facebook, Twitter...)	21.7%	25%	30.4%	23.3%
No response	0.4%	0%	0%	0%

## WHICH (WHOSE) MEDIA DO YOU TRUST THE MOST?

The analysis of trust in the media reveals clear differences in attitudes toward various sources of information. Albanian-language media in Kosovo receive the lowest level of trust, with an average rating of just 1.73. This low score indicates strong mistrust, likely influenced by linguistic, cultural, and political differences. In contrast, Serbian-language media operating within Kosovo enjoy the highest level of trust, with an average rating of 3.28, suggesting that citizens are more inclined to trust media that communicate in their native language and cover their daily lives and experiences. Trust in independent media from Belgrade and nationally broadcast media from Belgrade falls in the middle of the scale, with average scores of 2.99 and 2.75, respectively. These results suggest a moderate level of trust, but also a conscious distance from media based outside of Kosovo. The decline in trust in Belgrade-based media may be attributed to public disillusionment stemming from perceptions of incomplete and politically biased reporting, which has led to a more negative view of these outlets as reliable sources of information.

	Average Score
National media from Belgrade	2.75
Independent media from Belgrade	2.99
Serbian media in Kosovo	3.28
Albanian language media in Kosovo	1.73


Overall, there is less trust in the media in the north. Here, respondents trust less the national media from Belgrade (average 2.33) and even less, Albanian-language media from Kosovo (1.54). Trust in Serbian media in Kosovo is most pronounced in communities south of the Ibar, with an average score of 3.37.




Trends from the past five years show a clear increase in trust toward Kosovo-based media, while confidence in media from Belgrade continues to decline. The average trust rating for Serbian-language media in Kosovo rose from 2.79 to 3.28, reflecting growing confidence in local information sources. This trend is likely linked to a strengthened sense of identity and increased recognition of responsible journalism in Kosovo, particularly during crises in the north, where the speed and reliability of information delivery have proven crucial and most highly valued.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
National media from Belgrade	2.75	2.69	3.35	3.29	2.85
Independent media from Belgrade	2.99	2.88	2.97	3.12	2.69
Serbian media in Kosovo	3.28	2.94	2.92	2.82	2.79
Albanian language media in Kosovo	1.73	1.72	1.60	1.57	1.61


## DO YOU THINK YOU CAN FREELY EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS?




Encouraging findings on regarding freedom of expression among members of the Serbian community in Kosovo reveal that a significant portion of respondents still feel able to voice their views freely, suggesting a relatively favorable environment for public discourse and political engagement. Specifically, 43.7% of respondents said they can express their opinions freely, while an additional 12.5% believe they can do so absolutely. These perceptions are particularly relevant in the context of the socio-political processes that have marked recent years and influenced trends within the Serbian community in Kosovo.



## ARE INDEPENDENT VIEWS AND CRITICAL THINKING SUFFICIENTLY REPRESENTED IN THE MEDIA IN KOSOVO?



The continued growth of trust in local media, while notable, has not dispelled deeply rooted doubts about their independence and the presence of critical thinking. This suggests a prevailing skepticism about the role of media as a platform for open and free exchange of ideas. While trust in the media is gradually increasing, it is crucial to identify the specific factors that continue to shape public perception, especially among communities living south of the Ibar River. This phenomenon could be interpreted as a reflection of the complex socio-political environment in which media outlets operate. Serbian-language editorial teams face additional challenges, including limited financial resources and constraints on freedom of the press. Beyond structural limitations, various forms of indirect pressure are particularly troubling, as they often diminish the media's ability to deliver independent, responsible journalism. Moreover, the long-standing absence of political exchange and constructive dialogue among Serbian political representatives in Kosovo further underscores the lack of space for open and pluralistic debate. In this environment, the development of a public sphere conducive to objective and critical analysis becomes significantly hindered, especially on sensitive issues related to interethnic relations, historical conflicts, post-conflict processes, and politically charged narratives that fuel social polarization. In light of these challenges, it is essential to reflect on strategies that could strengthen media independence, create space for the free exchange of ideas, and foster critical public discourse as a prerequisite for more stable social relations in Kosovo.









The background features a large, light-colored gear centered on the page. Surrounding the gear are several bar charts with varying bar heights and numerical values. The word 'ANALYSIS' is written vertically on the left side. The overall color palette is a range of greys and purples.

**SAFETY OF  
CITIZENS**

## HAS YOUR SAFETY OR THE SAFETY OF YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY BEEN THREATENED IN THE PAST YEAR?



The data show that the sense of personal security among members of the Serbian community in Kosovo remains seriously compromised. On average, nearly one in five respondents (18.1%) reported feeling that their safety was threatened over the past year, highlighting the presence of a persistent sense of insecurity within the community. This perception is even more pronounced north of the Ibar River, where 29.1% of respondents reported feeling endangered—nearly twice the overall average. These findings suggest that, although there is a declarative perception of freedom of expression, insecurity in everyday life remains a serious issue, especially in areas experiencing heightened political and security tensions. The situation in northern Kosovo, as a region with specific security challenges, confirms that stability remains fragile and that any escalation could significantly disrupt the already precarious balance.




Although the number of respondents who reported feeling endangered has significantly decreased—from 61% in 2023 to 18.1% in 2024—it still represents a substantial share of the population, clearly pointing to the persistence of a deep-rooted sense of insecurity. This decline, while encouraging, does not erase the lingering fears linked to political instability and the potential for violence. In northern Kosovo in particular, fear remains a dominant lens through which citizens interpret political processes, institutional actions, and daily life. The continued high perception of threat, even amid visible improvement from the previous year, suggests that security is not yet perceived as stable or permanently assured, but rather as a fragile condition that can be quickly undermined by new crises.


	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
<b>Yes, it was threatened</b>	18.1%	61.4%	16.4%	18.3%	18.5%
<b>No, it wasn't</b>	81.3%	38.6%	83.6%	81.7%	81.5%
<b>No response</b>	0.6%	0%	0%	0%	0%

## WHAT ARE THE BIGGEST SECURITY RISKS IN YOUR ENVIRONMENT?

Citizens are very good at recognizing the greatest risk threatening them in their environment: primarily “political instability”, then “interethnic incidents” and “crime”.



The data is approximately the same for both respondents in the north and those in the south, with small differences observed.






The background features a light gray globe centered on the left side. Overlaid on the globe and extending across the page are several semi-transparent bar charts. The charts display various numerical values, including 335, 325, 175, 350, 395, 370, and 290. The word 'ANALYSIS' is partially visible in the bottom left corner.

# **MIGRATION TENDENCIES**




## DID ANYONE FROM YOUR SURROUNDINGS LEAVE KOSOVO LAST YEAR?



■ Yes  
■ No

The data clearly shows that emigration remains a deeply entrenched phenomenon within the Serbian community in Kosovo. Two-thirds of respondents (66%) reported that someone from their immediate circle left Kosovo during the past year. This trend is especially pronounced in the north, where 70.9% of respondents said they know someone who has left, while in the south the figure is slightly lower, yet still high at 61.3%. Migration from the Serbian community is a stark indicator of a profound loss of trust in the prospect of long-term stability, alongside frequent security incidents and persistent economic and social pressures that continue to drive people away. Particularly alarming is the fact that the majority of those seeking an escape from prolonged uncertainty are young people—two-thirds of them—undermining the demographic and developmental potential of the Serbian community in the years ahead.




The number of those who left Kosovo peaked in 2023, when as many as 83.8% of respondents from the Serbian community stated they knew someone who had left. While this percentage is slightly lower in 2024, emigration remains a prominent and troubling trend. This ongoing process directly reflects the sustained pressures experienced by the Serbian community over the past three years, primarily due to frequent security incidents, political tensions, and the closure of institutions funded by the Republic of Serbia that once provided essential services. These measures, driven by decisions made by the Government of Kosovo, have further destabilized the daily lives of Serbs in Kosovo, diminished their sense of personal security, and reinforced a widespread perception among respondents that the prospects for survival and a dignified life have been seriously undermined.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Yes	66%	83.8%	78.7%	69.8%	77.2%
No	34%	16.2%	21.3%	30.2%	22.8%

**FROM THE PEOPLE YOU KNOW WHO HAD LEFT KOSOVO,  
ARE THERE ANY CHILDREN WHO DROPPED OUT OF  
PRIMARY SCHOOL, AMONG THEM?**


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
Among those who have left Kosovo, respondents reported that in 77.1% of cases, the individuals included elementary school-aged children. This finding underscores a deeply concerning trend, closely linked to ongoing security concerns and the perceived lack of safety —factors cited as the primary reasons why families with school-aged children, mostly relocating to central Serbia, decide to leave. The trend of schoolchildren leaving is especially prominent in areas north of the Ibar River, where 70.9% of respondents reported knowing someone who had emigrated, compared to a slightly lower yet still alarmingly high 61.3% in southern areas. These findings point to a significant destabilization of the community, as the departure of children in this age group threatens the long-term capacity of the Serbian community to maintain its social and cultural infrastructure in Kosovo.



## DO YOU SEE YOURSELF IN KOSOVO IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?



Trends within the Serbian community in Kosovo are clearly reflected in responses to the question, “Do you see yourself living in Kosovo five years from now?” Nearly one-third of respondents (31.8%) stated they would leave if given the opportunity, while an additional 20.3% explicitly said they do not see themselves in Kosovo at all. This means that a majority of respondents either intend or are willing to leave. These troubling and recurring findings point to a deeply rooted sense of insecurity and pessimism about the long-term viability of life for the Serbian community in Kosovo.




Over the past five years, there has been a pronounced and persistent sense of pessimism within the Serbian community in Kosovo, which is also reflected in their perception of their personal future. The negative trend remains present – every second respondent states that they see themselves living in Kosovo in the next five years. This finding points to a deeply rooted distrust in the possibility of a stable and dignified life under the current socio-political circumstances.


	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Yes	47.3%	44.5%	51.7%	44.7%	53.9%
No	20.3%	31.8%	21%	29.1%	20.4%
I will leave if I get the chance	31.8%	23.7%	27.3%	26.2%	25.7%
No response	0.6%	0%	0%	0%	0%

### What is the main reason why you would leave Kosovo?

The main reasons cited by respondents for potentially leaving Kosovo are primarily political instability and the lack of respect for the rights of Serbs in Kosovo. These issues dominate as the most significant factors shaping perceptions of the future in the region. Closely behind are concerns about personal safety and economic uncertainty, which further contribute to a prevailing sense of insecurity and reinforce the desire to leave. This pattern of responses suggests that migration trends are not driven solely by economic factors, but are largely rooted in a broader perception of an unstable and unfavorable political and social environment for long-term residence.



Similar frequency of responses occurs in both the north and the south, with the exception of disrespect for rights, which is more pronounced in the responses of citizens living in the north (28 versus 22 percent).







**STANCES  
TOWARDS THE  
EUROPEAN  
UNION**



**WHEN YOU HEAR “EUROPEAN UNION”,  
IS YOUR FIRST ASSOCIATION POSITIVE  
OR NEGATIVE?**



Dialogue facilitators should be concerned with the predominantly negative perception of the role played by EU. It is only slightly better than in 2023, when it had reached 13%. This negative perception is, perhaps as expected, more pronounced north of the Ibar.




The percentage has changed only slightly over the past five years, and a high number of respondents still have “no opinion” on the role of the EU, which is quite difficult to explain considering its central role in the dialogue process.


	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Positive	16.9%	13%	9.8%	12.4%	12%
Negative	46.5%	51.5%	52.8%	48%	48.5%
I have no opinion	36.6%	35.5%	37.4%	39.6%	39.4%

## HOW DO YOU PERCEIVE THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA?

In principle, citizens believe that Brussels is favoring Pristina.



There is a difference in the responses of respondents from the north of Kosovo and those living south of the Ibar. Thus, citizens in municipalities in the south are more prone to believe that EU is neutral in its efforts.




Empirical data show a gradual strengthening in the perception of the European Union's neutrality in the negotiation process between Pristina and Belgrade over the past five years. However, despite this positive trend, approximately two-thirds of respondents still believe that the EU favors Pristina—an opinion that has remained consistent in public opinion analyses throughout this period.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
The EU is neutral	24.9%	19.4%	23.5%	23.3%	16.8%
EU is siding more with Pristina	73.2%	78%	75.6%	74.1%	80.8%
EU is siding more with Belgrade	1.6%	2.6%	0.9%	2.6%	2.4%
No response	0.3%	0%	0%	0%	0%

While Serbs in Kosovo generally do not hold particularly positive views of the European Union, nor place full trust in it, they nonetheless recognize its necessity. This ambivalence is reflected in the relatively high levels of agreement with statements such as “The EU plays a key role in interethnic reconciliation in Kosovo” (average rating of 2.52), and “The EU plays a key role in addressing the problems of the Serbian community” (average rating of 2.77).

	Average Score
EU has a key role in solving the problems of the Serb community in Kosovo	2.77
EU plays a key role in interethnic reconciliation in Kosovo	2.52
EU invests sufficiently in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo	1.96

Again, somewhat in line with other responses, all of the aforementioned values are lower north of the Ibar.



Awareness that the European Union plays a key role both in addressing the problems of the Serbian community and in promoting interethnic reconciliation has gradually strengthened over the past five years, despite a decline in 2023. However, it remains concerning that the EU’s efforts to invest in Serbian-populated areas continue to receive poor ratings. The average evaluation still falls short of reaching even a basic threshold of acceptable trust.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
EU has a key role in solving the problems of the Serb community in Kosovo	2.77	2.76	3.35	2.60	2.42
EU plays a key role in interethnic reconciliation in Kosovo	2.52	2.49	2.38	2.44	2.24
EU invests sufficiently in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo	1.96	2.00	1.89	2.20	2.00







**ETHNIC  
DISTANCE**

ANALYSIS

335

325

350

395

370


290

175




In order to move forward on the issue of reconciliation, ethnic distance needs to be overcome. And it will be difficult to overcome it if citizens “rarely” or “never” interact with Albanian citizens, while the reasons for such a state of affairs is a topic of another study.

## HOW OFTEN DO YOU GO TO AREAS WHERE ALBANIANS ARE THE MAJORITY?




Naturally, things are different in the south – there, Serb citizens gravitate on daily basis or often towards the areas with Albanian majority.



It is important to note that the number of members of the Serbian community who report having daily or frequent contact (once or more times per week) with Albanians has been steadily increasing, compared to 2023, representing a positive trend. At the same time, the share of those who say their contact with members of the Albanian community is rare has been decreasing.


	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Never	12.7%	13.7%	10.1%	9.6%	14.8%
Rarely (less than once a week)	33.6%	44.8%	38.8%	50.4%	48.5%
Often (once to several times a week)	31.2%	25.2%	40.6%	31.5%	30.4%
Daily	22.5%	16.3%	10.5%	8.5%	6.3%

Your experiences from personal contacts with Albanians are mainly:



Experiences of interaction are mainly positive (31.4%), or neutral (50.9%), which would lead to the conclusion that resistance to interaction itself is unreasonable (and that the pressure is being exerted by someone else, far from the “ordinary person”).

The frequency of negative and positive experiences is slightly more pronounced in the opinions voiced by respondents living north of the Ibar.



After the peak recorded in 2023, the frequency of negative experiences decreased again and stabilized at 12.3%. The number of citizens who responded they “have no contact with Albanians” decreased from 15% to 5%.

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
<b>Positive</b>	31.4%	20.1%	21.5%	18.5%	21%
<b>Negative</b>	12.3%	24.5%	12%	13.3%	8.7%
<b>Neutral</b>	50.9%	48.4%	52.8%	56.7%	55.2%
<b>I have no contacts with Albanians</b>	5.2%	7%	13.7%	11.5%	15%
<b>No response</b>	0.2%	0%	0%	0%	0%

The greatest distance prevails between Serbs and Albanians, while the relationship between Serbs and members of other communities (Bosniak, Roma, etc.) is good or very good (rated with an average score of more than 3.5).

	Average Score
<b>Serbs and Albanians</b>	2.31
<b>Serbs and Bosniaks</b>	3.32
<b>Serbs and Goranis</b>	3.71
<b>Serbs and Romas</b>	3.47

Although previous findings continue to reflect a near-unanimous opposition to the idea of having an Albanian son- or daughter-in-law or spouse, it is nonetheless encouraging to observe a growing number of individuals who are increasingly open to accepting Albanians as colleagues, supervisors, and importantly as friends.





**CONCLUSION**





Serb citizens living in Kosovo struggle and persist within a system that has been “excluding” and neglecting them for years back, while gazing towards the other system that, apart from material support (which is not negligible), has little to offer. However, this resilience is not everlasting. It is influenced by economic and all other prospects, migratory pressures, political instability, and finally – physical safety.

In the end and despite everything, the respondents exhibit extraordinary resilience. When asked about their material status, a significant number thereof (practically 4 out of every 10 respondents – 38.9% north, 41% south of the Ibar) responded with “neutral”, i.e. with a score of 3. According to one of our interviewees “it makes sense that citizens in the north are dissatisfied with their quality of life compared to citizens in the south,” as “the measures of the government in Pristina apply first and foremost to the north.” There, let us recall, interim bodies that operate in the Serbian system are shut down, while not being replicated everywhere south of the Ibar.

There is still a high degree of ethnic distance between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Individual relationships showcase that ethnicity has the most negative impact on the choice of partner in marriage or kinship. However, slightly more than half of respondents would accept an Albanian as a friend, indicating that this is an area where ethnic distance can be reduced moving forward.

Finally, all stakeholders involved in political processes in Kosovo should be concerned about the data presented in our research. They go on to show that Kosovo society is moving backwards; that much of the positive brought upon by dialogue and normalization has been lost, we will see whether irreversibly or not; and that in the context of imposed solutions and fait accompli policy, the community dissatisfaction will only continue to grow.





